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Abstract 
This study attempts to identify and trace inter-linkages between sovereign and banking risk in the euro area. 
To this end, we use an indicator of banking risk in each country based on the Contingent Claim Analysis 
literature, and 10-year government yield spreads over Germany as a measure of sovereign risk. We apply a 
dynamic approach to testing for Granger causality between the two measures of risk in 10 euro area 
countries, allowing us to check for contagion in the form of a significant and abrupt increase in short-run 
causal linkages. The empirical results indicate that episodes of contagion vary considerably in both directions 
over time and within the different EMU countries. Significantly, we find that causal linkages tend to 
strengthen particularly at the time of major financial crises. The empirical evidence suggests the presence of 
contagion, mainly from banks to sovereigns. 
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1. Introduction 
Today, close to five years since the outbreak of the European Economic and Monetary 
Union (EMU) sovereign debt crisis in late 2009 – when the newly elected Greek 
government announced that the country’s budget deficit was much larger than previously 
reported – we can see that its origin goes deeper than the fiscal imbalances in euro 
countries. The interconnection between private and public debt, and thus between banking 
and sovereign crises, is obvious. However, whether it was private debt that ultimately 
bankrupted sovereigns, or whether, conversely, it was excessive public debt that 
undermined the banking sector is a question that is not easily answered.  Indeed, the main 
causes of the debt crises in Europe vary according to country. In some countries, the 
public sector was overwhelmed by the costs of cleaning up the banking system and was 
forced to seek bail-outs (e.g., Ireland and Spain); while in others, the main source of 
vulnerability was concentrated in the public sector balance sheet itself (e.g., Greece, 
Portugal and Italy).  
Some authors (Brunnemeier et al., 2011 and Reichlin, 2013, among them) describe the 
development of a “diabolic loop” in EMU countries as European banks, encouraged by the 
absence of any regulatory discrimination between bonds, held an excessive part of the 
national debt, which – far from being safe – fed never-ending speculation on the banks’ 
solvency. In turn, sovereigns were in constant danger of having to rescue their banks, 
which, combined with the uncertainty regarding the kind of fiscal support they would 
receive from their European partners, increased the riskiness of their bonds. Finally, 
European policymakers lacked the institutions and resources to intervene in all the troubled 
sovereign debt markets. In this context, the European Central Bank (ECB) ended up 
holding the riskiest of the sovereign bonds as it became the sole source of financing for the 
troubled banks. Indeed, some authors (see Shambaugh, 2012) have pointed out that the 
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euro area has faced three interlocking crises (banking, sovereign debt, and economic 
growth) which together challenged the viability of the currency union. According to this 
thinking, these crises connected with one another in several ways: the problems of weak 
banks and high sovereign debt were mutually reinforcing, and both were exacerbated by 
weak, constrained growth.  
An analysis of the interrelationship between debt and growth – an unresolved issue of  
great importance, on which there is no consensus in the literature [see Krugman (2011), 
DeLong and Summers (2012), Cochrane (2011) or Reinhart & Rogoff (2010), to name just 
a few] – is beyond the scope of this paper. Rather, we will focus on the interconnection 
between banking and sovereign debt crises in EMU countries. While there is a substantial 
amount of literature exploring the determinants of either bank risk or sovereign risk in 
isolation, few papers to date have looked at the interdependence or contagion between the 
sovereign and the banking sectors. Exceptions are Alter and Schüler (2012), Gross and 
Kok (2013) and Alter and Beyer (2014), who applied different extensions of vector 
autoregressive models; and De Bruyckere et al. (2013) who investigated the presence of 
contagion by computing excess correlation (over and above what one would expect from 
fundamental factors). However, though they use different methodologies, all these papers 
applied the same measure of banking and sovereign risk: credit default swap (CDS)1 
spreads on 5-year senior debt contracts, since these are known to be the most actively 
traded and therefore the most liquid. Indeed, CDS markets (in both the sovereign and the 
banking sectors) have been quite illiquid since late 2008, well after the start of the US 
Financial crisis. 
                                                          
1 The theoretical use of a CDS contract is to provide insurance against unexpected losses due to a default by a corporate or sovereign 
entity. The debt issuer is known as the reference entity, and a default or restructuring on the predefined debt contract is known as a 
credit event. In the most general terms, it is a bilateral deal in which a “protection buyer” pays a periodic fixed premium, usually 
expressed in basis points of the reference asset’s nominal value, to a counterpart known by convention as the “protection seller”. The 
total amount paid per year as a percentage of the notional principal is known as the CDS spread.  
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In this context, our paper makes two contributions to this branch of the literature. First, we 
apply indicators of bank and sovereign risk that have not been used in previous work. Our 
indicator of banking risk in each country is based on the Contingent Claim Analysis (CCA) 
framework. As far as we know, this is the first paper to use this measure to examine the 
interconnection between bank and sovereign risk in the euro area. Specifically, the average 
aggregate “distance-to-default” indicator in the banking sector in each EMU country will 
be the proxy of banking risk used in the analysis. This indicator, which is based on 
Merton’s model (1974), is calculated and broadly explained in Singh et al. (2014). On the 
other hand, 10-year government yield spreads over Germany will be our measure of 
sovereign risk2, since they reflect the premium that investors demand in order to bear the 
risk of a government default. The use of these indicators will allow us to examine the 
interconnection between the risk in the sovereign and the banking sectors from 2005 (more 
than three years before the onset of the global financial crisis).  
Second, we use a methodology that has not been employed to date in this context. We 
apply dynamic Granger-causality tests between the two measures of risk in 10 of the 
countries that have belonged to the EMU from its inception, during the sample period 
                                                          
2 Some authors contend that past CDS spreads improve the forecast quality of bond yield spreads (Palladini and Portes, 2011; Fontana 
and Scheicher, 2010). As Caporin et al. (2013) point out, unlike CDS, bond spreads may be affected by many other factors (they are, for 
example, more sensitive to monetary policy and the actions of the central bank and policymakers). However, CDS markets (in both the 
sovereign and the banking sectors) have been quite illiquid since late 2008, only one year before the onset of the euro sovereign debt 
crisis. This is why we decided to make use of 10-year yield spreads over euro-denominated German government bonds instead of CDS. 
We also decided to use the ten-year Bund yields as a proxy for the risk-free benchmark; they are considered as such in many academic 
studies because German sovereign debt has enjoyed a high credit rating for some time now and its returns can be seen as a good proxy 
for risk-free asset returns. For the sake of simplicity, this convention is maintained in the paper, although this decision means that 
Germany must be omitted from the analysis. Another alternative proxy for the risk-free benchmark would have been the interest rate 
swap (IRS). However, we decided against its use because the IRS might include systemic risk coming from the financial institutions (see 
Palladini and Portes, 2011).  
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2004-Q4 to 2013-Q3.3 A clear advantage of this methodology is that it not only allows 
detection of contagion, but also a consideration of the asymmetry between banking and 
sovereign risk inter-linkages (impossible using correlation analysis, which does not give an 
indication of the direction of the spillover). Indeed, following Forbes and Rigobon (2002), 
contagion is associated with a significant, short-run abrupt increase in the causal linkages 
taking place exclusively during a period of crisis.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the linkages between 
sovereign and banking risk in EMU countries. An attempt to quantify both the banking 
and sovereign levels of indebtedness in each euro area country is presented in section 3. 
Section 4 briefly explains the creation of our banking risk indicator based on the CCA 
literature. The econometric methodology and data used in our analysis are presented in 
Section 5. Section 6 summarizes the main results and, finally, Section 7 offers some 
concluding remarks.  
 
2. Inter-linkages between sovereign and banking risk  
The financial crisis first erupted in the summer of 2007 but deepened and spread after the 
collapse of Lehman Brothers in the autumn of 2008. Following the Lehman Brothers crisis 
severe tensions emerged in financial markets worldwide, including the euro zone. In fact, 
the period of financial turmoil not only turned into a global financial crisis but also began 
to spread to the real sector, with a rapid, synchronized deterioration in most major 
economies. After a brief recovery (2010-2011), in 2012 the euro area plunged into a second 
recession, triggered by tensions in the sovereign debt market and more broadly in the 
                                                          
3 Luxembourg is exempted from the present analysis, because of its very low level of outstanding sovereign bonds; Germany is also 
excluded since its yield is used as a benchmark in the sovereign risk calculation. Besides, Greece has been incorporated, although this 
country joined the euro in 2001. 
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financial system as a whole. On the one hand, the financial crisis put the spotlight on the 
macroeconomic and fiscal imbalances within EMU countries which had largely been 
ignored during the period of stability, when markets seemed to underestimate the 
possibility that governments might default (see Beirne and Fratzscher, 2013). Specifically, 
the announcement of Greece’s distressed debt position in late 2009 triggered a sudden fall 
in investor confidence that led to a “flight-to-safety” and marked the beginning of the euro 
area sovereign debt crisis since yield spreads of euro area issues with respect to Germany 
spiralled. 
On the other hand, in some EMU countries, when the sustainability of their high public 
debts was called into question, sovereign risk quickly spread to the banks because they held 
substantial amounts of government debt; while in others, problems in the banking sector 
spread to sovereign states because of the excessive debt issues made in order to save the 
financial industry. Therefore, a ‘‘two-way feedback’’ (see Acharya et al., 2014 or Hau et al., 
2012)4 truly existed between EMU sovereign and banking crises. To examine whether the 
trigger risk varies over time and depending on the country is one of the main objectives of 
this paper.  
As the US subprime crisis unfolded, in parallel with the increase in global financial 
instability, the concern about exposure of euro area banks to bad assets rose. The banks’ 
                                                          
4 Acharya et al. (2014) recently used the term ‘‘two-way feedback’’ to describe the interdependencies that exist between the banking and 
the sovereign sector. According to these authors, a systemic banking crisis can induce a contraction of the entire economy, which will 
weaken public finances and transfer the distress to the government. This contagion effect is amplified when state guarantees exist for the 
financial sector. As a feedback effect, risk is further transmitted to holders of sovereign debt. An increase in the cost of sovereign debt 
will lead to a devaluation of government debt, which will impair the balance sheets of banks holding these assets. Hau et al. (2012) who 
examine the sensitivity of long-term bank ratings changes to sovereign rating changes suggest thaty it depends upon economic cycle and 
countries’ economic conditions. These authors stand that two main sources of the interactions between bank risky debt and sovereign 
debt might be discussed. The first one is given by the structure of banks’ assets, since in times of distress, they tend to increase their 
exposure to sovereign debt in order to preserve the value and the liquidity of their assets; whilst the second source of interactions comes 
from public authorities’ capacity to support banks’ risky debt. 
 8
exposure to the bonds of their own governments became a crucial question, in the absence 
of any regulatory discrimination between bonds; this absence meant that banks did not 
need to hold a capital buffer against their holdings of euro-denominated sovereign bonds, 
irrespective of the euro area country issuing the bond5.  This home bias was clearly revealed 
in the results of the stress tests of the European Banking Authority (EBA) banks, which 
showed that banks tended to be heavily exposed to the sovereign debt of their own 
country, thus inducing stress transmission from the sovereign to the financial sector. 
[Insert Figure 1a here] 
Specifically, in seven out of the 10 EMU countries in our sample, the banks’ exposure to 
their own countries’ sovereign debt (see Figure 1a) was close to 50%, and even surpassed 
this threshold in December 2011. Therefore, it seems that banks in peripheral euro area 
countries (Spain: 81%, Ireland: 65%, Greece: 60%, Italy: 50% and Portugal: 49%) 
concentrated their portfolio of government bonds in the bonds of their own countries, 
rather than seeking safety by holding bonds of other countries. These results indicate 
(Figure 1b) that at the end of 2011, Greek commercial banks held the equivalent of 52% of 
Greek GDP in the form of Greek government bonds. Spanish banks held local sovereign 
debt equivalent to 44% of the country’s GDP; whilst the comparable figures for Portugal, 
Italy and Ireland banks were 23%, 21% and 15% respectively. 
[Insert Figure 1b here] 
Besides, in the aftermath of the collapse of Lehman Brothers, when losses on exposures to 
this institution showed up in the balance sheets of banks around the globe, it became 
evident not only that the world was facing a ‘‘systemic’’ financial crisis, but also that it was 
driven by concerns over solvency which threatened the stability of the global financial 
system and could induce a contraction of the entire economy. In this context, in the 
                                                          
5 See European Central Bank (2014) 
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autumn of 2008 the European Commission presented the European Economic Recovery 
Plan to deal with the consequences of the economic crisis in the European Union (EU) 
and gave governments the go-ahead for bank bailout programmes.  
While mistrust between financial players causes funding markets to dry up, concerns over 
the solvency of financial institutions can severely affect the confidence of depositors and 
reveal the weaknesses of deposit insurance schemes. Besides, unlike liquidity concerns 
(which are understood to be a supranational issue to be addressed by the ECB) the 
question of bank solvency is treated as a national matter. Indeed, although banks in Europe 
operate across national borders, with the same currency and lender of last resort, they are 
subject to different supervisory authorities and lack any mutual bank support across 
countries. This is why national governments across the euro area stepped in to provide 
banks under their jurisdiction with funds or guarantees. Practically all euro-area 
governments adopted a series of extraordinary measures in early October 2008 in order to 
stabilize their banking systems which would have been unimaginable only months 
previously, with some institutions even being broken up. These measures included direct 
injection of capital into the banks, state guarantees of bank liabilities, loans to the banking 
sector, acquisition of bad assets, nationalization of some firms, and individual rescues (see 
Petrovic and Tutsch, 2009, Stolz and Wedow, 2010, Shambaugh, 2012 and Toader, 2013).  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
By mid-2010, total commitments (from capital injections to liability guarantees) ranged 
from roughly 4% to over 300% of GDP across euro-area countries. Table 1 shows that, 
with the exception of Ireland and Spain, the support given to the financial sector was 
higher in central than in peripheral countries. Based on the ratio of total commitment to 
GDP, the 10 EMU countries under study6 can be ranked as follows (in descending order): 
Ireland, the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, Finland, Spain, France, Greece, Portugal and 
                                                          
6 Recall that Germany is excluded from our analysis. 
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Italy. They can also be clustered into three groups: high commitment (above 75% of 
GDP), Ireland; medium commitment (between 20% and 75% of GDP), the Netherlands, 
Belgium, Austria, Finland and Spain; and low commitment (below 20% of GDP), France, 
Greece, Portugal and Italy.  
As the IMF (2011) highlights, these rescue operations not only increased national debt 
burdens and but also caused a deterioration of their public finances. So, when the rescue 
packages were put in place, the cost of insuring a bond against default fell sharply for the 
banks, as bonds were then perceived as being safer (Ejsing and Lemke 2011, Acharya et al. 
2014). But at the same time, the correlation between the cost of insuring sovereign debt 
and general perceptions of financial risk in the world economy rose, as national 
governments were now responsible for the financial losses in many countries. The result 
was a “risk transfer” from banks to governments; not only was sovereign stress transmitted 
to the financial sector as we noted above, but also financial stress was transmitted to 
sovereigns (Mody and Sandri, 2012). 
This is the background to the sudden loss of investor confidence in the euro area sovereign 
markets when, in late 2009, the Greek government announced the disastrous position of its 
public finances. Indeed, in May 2010 Greece’s financial problems became so severe that the 
country needed to be bailed out. An important reason for providing financial support to 
Greece was the fear of contagion (see, for instance, Constâncio, 2012), since, from there, 
investors turned their attention to the fiscal imbalances within euro area countries. 
Nevertheless, since May 2010 not only has Greece been rescued twice, but Ireland, 
Portugal and Cyprus have also needed bailouts to stay afloat, and in the middle of the 
sovereign debt crisis, Spain requested financial assistance to recapitalize its banking sector. 
In this context of financial distress and huge liquidity problems, the ECB and other central 
banks responded forcefully by implementing nonstandard monetary policies (i.e., policies 
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beyond setting the refinancing rate).7 In particular, the ECB’s principal means of 
intervention, in times of crisis, was the system known as long term refinancing operations 
(LTRO). Through these operations the ECB expanded its balance sheet, increasing 
reserves on the liability side against mostly conventional assets (repo loans to banks) on the 
asset side. As the crisis unfolded, these policies involved maturity transformation (the term 
of the repo loans, one year in 2009, was extended to three years in 2011), as well as higher 
liquidity provision (banks were able to borrow as much as they liked at the fixed rate)8. At 
the same time there was also a relaxation of the collateral requirement and an increase in 
the eligible counterparties (see Lenza et al. 2010 for details).  
[Insert Figure 1c here] 
Figure 1c shows the volume of ECB LTRO operations from 1999 to the second quarter of 
2013, jointly with the GDP growth in the euro area. Two peaks in LTRO volume are 
observed; each one followed the periods of recession in the euro area economy and thus 
increased the tension and lack of liquidity in the markets.  
Although the LTRO may have been a crucial solution to banks’ liquidity problems, if the 
banks used those funds to make still more sovereign debt purchases, then the connection 
                                                          
7 When the crisis struck, big central banks like the US Federal Reserve slashed their overnight interest-rates in order to boost the 
economy. However, even cutting the rate as far as it could go (to almost zero) failed to spark recovery. Then, the Fed began 
experimenting with other tools to encourage banks to pump money into the economy. One of them was Quantitative Easing (QE). To 
carry out QE, central banks create money by buying securities, such as government bonds, from banks, with electronic cash that did not 
exist before. The new money swells the size of bank reserves in the economy by the quantity of assets purchased—hence “quantitative” 
easing. In the euro area, the principal means of intervention adopted by the ECB was the LTRO, which was notably different from the 
QE policies of the Federal Reserve, in which the Fed purchased assets outright rather than helping to fund banks’ ability to purchase 
them. The LTRO is not the only non-standard monetary policy implemented by the ECB since the crisis. Other measures were the 
narrowing of the corridor, the change in eligibility criteria for collateral, interventions in the covered bonds market and, most 
importantly, the ECB’s launch of the security market program in 2010, involving interventions in the secondary sovereign bond market. 
The latter program was discontinued in 2011. 
8 On 22 November, 2011, the ECB allotted 489.2 billion Euros for a period of 1134 days, whilst on 1 March, 2012 the amount allotted to 
banks was 529.5 billion Euros for a period of 1092 days. 
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between banks and sovereigns was strengthened as banks held even more sovereign debt 
which could endanger their safety down the road in the case of a sovereign default. Some 
authors (Uhlig, 2013, among them)9 point out that pressure from governments on banks 
within their jurisdiction to buy their debt might be behind these high levels of country 
sovereign debt holdings in a context of recession. Acharya and Steffen (2013) present a 
careful empirical analysis of the “carry trade” by banks and argue that their choice to hold 
risky peripheral bonds was the result of their belief in the survival of the Eurozone, as ECB 
policy allowed them to finance their investments in short-term wholesale markets. 
Therefore, they report that the “home bias” increase (greater exposure of domestic banks 
to its sovereign bonds) was partly explained by the ECB’s funding of these positions. As a 
result, some authors (see Acharya et. al., 2014) have demonstrated that the cost of insuring 
bank bonds varies with the cost of insuring the sovereign debt that these banks hold. That 
is, the increased risk of sovereign default was directly translated in the market into an 
increased risk of bank default. 
 
3. Banking and sovereign leverage in the euro area 
In the last section we described the channels through which sovereign stress might have 
been transmitted to the financial sector, and financial stress to sovereigns. In this section 
our aim is to emphasize the reasons why both sectors were in a distressed position during 
the period under study. With this goal in mind, we attempt to quantify the levels of both 
public and private debt in each euro area country, during the period December 2002-
                                                          
9 This author argues that regulators in risky countries have an incentive to allow their banks to hold home risky bonds and risk defaults, 
while regulators in other “safe” countries will impose tighter regulation. As a result, governments in risky countries are able to borrow 
more cheaply, effectively shifting the risk of some of the potential sovereign default losses onto the common central bank. As a result, 
monetary union has become a system engineered to deliver underpriced loans from country banks to their sovereigns, and implicitly to 
shift sovereign default risk onto the balance sheet of the ECB and the rest of the Eurosystem. 
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September 2012. The variable we used to measure the public leverage ratio was the 
government debt-to-GDP, which is compiled on a quarterly basis from Eurostat. In 
addition, we built up a single dataset on private debt-to-GDP by sector (households, banks 
and non-financial corporations) in each EMU country with data taken from the ECB 
Statistics (the Monetary Financial Institutions (MFI) balance sheets) in each euro country. 
The construction and evolution over time of each private sectoral debt was described in 
detail in Gómez-Puig and Sosvilla-Rivero (2013). As regards banks’ debt, in order to isolate 
it from the intermediation effect that would inflate the ratios, this variable was constructed 
by subtracting M3, banks’ remaining liabilities and banks’ capital and reserves from total 
MFI liabilities10; the final value was normalized in each country by its GDP. 
 [Insert Figure 2 here] 
The graphs in Figure 2, which show the evolution of sovereigns’ and banks’ debt-to-GDP 
in both peripheral and central EMU countries, present some very interesting results. The 
ratio of public debt is very high in many euro area countries, and the ratio of banks’ debt is 
also very high. In particular, while in some peripheral EMU countries (Greece and Italy) 
the ratio of sovereign debt is higher than that of the banking sector throughout the period, 
in the other countries, both peripheral (Ireland, Portugal and Spain) and central (Austria, 
Belgium, Finland, France and the Netherlands), we find the opposite situation since, in 
general, the banks’ debt ratio began to increase from 2004. In particular, after the subprime 
crisis in August 2007, not only did the government level of indebtedness increase in the 
euro area (the ratio over GDP reached levels of 157%, 127%, 124%, 118%, 100%, 90% 
and 84% at the end of December 2012 in Greece, Italy, Portugal, Ireland, Belgium, France 
and Spain respectively) but private borrowing also recorded a sizeable increase. In 
                                                          
10 The banks’ debt variable we have constructed avoids the effects of intermediation, even though it can only be considered as an 
approximation of its real value. In addition, some caveats are in order: specifically, some deposits will appear as debt (those not included 
in M3) and some debt securities will not be considered as debt (those included in M3). 
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particular, as can be observed, at the end of 2012 banks’ debt-to-GDP was huge in Ireland 
(449%), but was also high in all EMU countries with the exception of Finland. Portugal, 
France, the Netherlands, Austria and Spain recorded ratios over GDP of 194%, 189%, 
188%, 164% and 152% respectively, while the ratio was around 100% in Greece and 
Belgium. 
Thus, during the period 2008-2012, whereas the government debt-to-GDP ratio registered 
the highest increases compared to the period 2002-2007 in Ireland, Greece and Portugal 
(58%, 38% and 35%), there was a much steeper rise in the banks’ debt-to-GDP ratio – 
over 190% in Ireland, close to 60% in Portugal and around 55% in Spain, Greece and 
Finland. These figures may help us to understand why the main causes of the debt crises in 
Europe vary according to the country. Therefore, the question of whether it was private 
debt which bankrupted sovereigns or whether on the other hand it was excessive public 
debt that undermined the banking sector is not an easy one to answer; in addition, it may 
vary depending on the country.  
Finally, it is noticeable that in 2012 a deleverage process had already started in some 
countries. So, from the peaks reached in 2007-2008, the graphs in Figure 2 show a 
deleverage trend in the Irish financial market and in all central EMU countries’ banking 
sectors, with the exception of Finland. 
 
4. Assessing banking risk: the “distance-to-default” indicator 
To assess the banking sector risk in individual EMU countries, we use a standard forward 
looking indicator based on contingent claim analysis: “Distance-to-default” (DtD). 
Contingent claim analysis has its genesis in Merton’s general derivative pricing model 
(Merton (1974)) in a framework that combines market-based and balance sheet information 
to obtain a set of financial risk indicators. In this context, the liabilities are viewed as 
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contingent claims against assets, with payoff determined by seniority. Since equity has 
limited liability and has the residual claim on the assets after all other obligations have been 
met, it becomes an implicit call option on the market value of assets with strike price 
defined by the debt barrier. 
DtD is an indirect measure and is recovered implicitly from the observed measures of bank 
equity prices and liabilities. Since equity is a junior claim to debt, it can be modelled as a 
standard call option on the assets with exercise price equal to the value of risky debt. The 
model uses no arbitrage and assumes a frictionless market. We assume that the firm’s asset 
returns follow a stochastic process with constant variance per unit time (σA). We also 
assume a simple capital structure with N shares of common stock with market capital E 
and zero coupon bonds with a face value of D with time to maturity T. The estimation 
methodology is as follows. 
We use the value conservation equation: 
A = E + D                                                                                                                       (1)                             
Given the assumption of assets distributed as a Generalized Brownian Motion, the 
application of the standard Black-Scholes option pricing formula (Black and Scholes 
(1973)) yields the closed-form expression: 
)()( 2
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1 dNDedANE
tT                                                                                               (2)  
where r is the risk-free rate under risk-neutrality, and N(•) is the cumulative normal 
distribution. The values of d1 and d2 are expressed as: 
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The Merton model uses an additional equation that links the asset volatility σA to the 
volatility of the bank’s equity σE by applying Ito’s Lemma: 
         (5) 
 
The Merton model uses Equations 1 and 2 to obtain the implied asset value A and volatility 
σA, which are not observable and must be estimated by inverting the two relationships. 
Once numerical solutions for A and σA are found, the T periods ahead of DtD is calculated 
as: 
( )
A
A DDtD
A

                                                                                                                                        (6) 
As is carefully explained in Singh et al. (2014), using this model to quantify DtD requires 
some practical compromises. Real debt contracts are not all written with a single terminal 
date. To overcome this problem, a common procedure used by Moody’s KMV, and also 
employed here, is to adopt a one year horizon T, but to weight longer term debt of 
maturity greater than one year at only 50% of face value. We also use the market value of 
firms’ equity, average quarterly historical volatilities as equity price return volatility, and 10-
year government bond yields as the risk-free interest rate. 
Once individual banks’ DtDs are calculated we aggregate the indicators in each country 
following Harada et al. (2013) and considering the systemic risk indicator as an average of 
individual DtD series. Specifically, two aggregate indicators can be used: the aggregate 
average DtD (aDtD) and the weighted average DtD (wDtD)11. The aDtD is obtained by 
taking the simple average across all credit institutions headquartered in a particular country:  
                                                          
11 However, this aggregation method ignores the joint distribution properties. Some authors [Gray et al. (2007); Gray and Jobst (2010); 
Duggar and Miltra (2007); Gray et al. (2010) and Gray and Jobst (2013)] provide further extensions to incorporate inter-linkages using 
rolling correlations or extreme value theory, and developed an extension to analyse a wide range of macro-financial issues.  
1( )E A
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E
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where DtDj,t is the individual DtD at time t of credit institution j, whilst the wDtD is based 
on the market capital-weighted average of DtD for all credit institutions headquartered in a 
particular country:  

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5. Econometric Methodology and Data 
The term “contagion”, generally used in contrast to “interdependence”, conveys the idea 
that after a shock there may be breaks or anomalies in the international transmission 
mechanism which arguably reflect switches across multiple equilibria, market panics 
unrelated to fundamentals, investors’ herding, and the like. Contagion has been defined in 
many different ways in the literature,12 including the transfer of any shock across countries 
(Edwards, 2000). Eichengreen and Rose (1999) and Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) define it 
as the situation in which knowledge of crisis in one country increases the risk of crisis in 
another one. 
Much of the empirical work on measuring the existence of contagion is based on 
comparing correlation coefficients during a relatively stable period with a crisis or a period 
of turbulence (see, e. g., Forbes and Rigobon, 2002 and Corsetti et al., 2005). In fact, Forbes 
and Rigobon (2002) argue that “contagion is a significant increase in cross-market co-
movements after a shock”. These authors stress that this notion of contagion excludes a 
constant high degree of co-movement that exists in all states of the world since; in that 
                                                          
12 Gómez-Puig and Sosvilla-Rivero (2014) present a detailed literature review of the different definitions of financial contagion and the 
most important strategies used in its empirical analysis. 
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case, markets would be just interdependent. This definition is sometimes referred as “shift-
contagion”; this very sensible term clarifies that contagion arises from a shift in cross-
market linkages, and also avoids taking a stance on how this shift occurs.13 
In our study we apply this definition of contagion and directly investigate changes in the 
existence and the intensity of causality between banking and sovereign risk among a sample 
of 10 euro area countries. To test for contagion, we adopt a dynamic approach in order to 
assess the evolving nature of the Granger causal linkages and to detect episodes of 
significant and transitory increases in the pair-wise Granger causal relationships which we 
identify with contagion. The intuition is that if the causal linkage intensifies during a period 
of turmoil relative to a period of tranquillity, this intensification is considered contagion, 
since the propagation of shocks from one risk to the other increases during this episode14.  
Our econometric methodology has several advantages over the alternative approach of 
focusing on contemporaneous correlations (corrected or not for volatility). First, while 
correlation is a symmetrical measure, Granger-causality is an asymmetrical one, so our 
procedure provides information on the direction of the contagion (from sovereign to 
banking risk, from banking to sovereign risk, or both). Second, the lag structure offers 
valuable information for understanding the information flow between the two types of risk. 
Third, by investigating dynamic causal linkages through a rolling window, we examine how 
the strength of the relationships evolves over time, allowing us to detect episodes of 
sudden and temporary increases in these relationships which we identify with contagion. 
Fourth, we establish an approximate periodization for contagion effects by looking directly 
into the data (i.e., without making a priori conjectures on the time periods during which the 
                                                          
13 See Forbes and Rigobon (2001).  
14 Masson (1998) has labelled these unanticipated situations as “pure contagion”, as distinct from “simple contagion” caused by 
“monsoonal effects” and “linkages”. “Monsoonal effects” are random aggregate shocks that hit a number of countries in a similar way, 
while “linkages” are normal interdependencies, such as those produced by trade and financial relations between countries. Only when the 
transmission process itself changes on entering a crisis period do we talk of contagion in the sense of Masson’s “pure contagion”. 
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contagion process might have started to spread). Additionally, like the VAR approach, our 
methodology enables us to capture the dynamic structure of the variables and offers a 
convenient framework for separating long-run and short-run components of the data 
generation process (DGP). 
5.1. Testing procedure 
The concept of Granger-causality was introduced by Granger (1969) and Sims (1972) and 
is widely used to ascertain the importance of the interaction between two series. As is well 
known, Granger causality is not a relationship between “causes” and “effects”. Rather, it is 
defined in terms of incremental predictive ability (Hoover, 2001): a variable Y is said to 
Granger-cause another variable X if past values of Y help to predict the current level of X 
better than past values of X alone, indicating that past values of Y have some informational 
content that is not present in past values of X. Therefore, knowledge of the evolution of 
the variable Y reduces the forecast errors of the variable X, suggesting that X does not 
evolve independently of Y.  This concept is suitable for identifying and monitoring 
spillovers. 
Tests of Granger causality typically use the same lags for all variables. This poses a 
potential problem, since Granger-causality tests are sensitive to lag length.15 In this paper 
we use Hsiao’s (1981) sequential method to test for causality to determine the optimal lag 
structure for each variable, combining Akaike’s final predictive error (FPE, from now on) 
and the definition of Granger-causality.16 Essentially, the FPE criterion trades off the bias 
that arises from under-parameterization of a model against a loss in efficiency resulting 
from its over-parameterization, removing the ambiguities of the conventional procedure.  
Consider the following models,  
                                                          
15 The general principle is that smaller lag lengths have smaller variance but run a risk of bias, while larger lags reduce the bias problem 
but may lead to inefficiency. 
16 Thornton and Batten (1985) show that Akaike’s FPE criterion performs well relative to other statistical techniques. 
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where Xt and Yt  are stationary variables [i.e., they are I(0) variables]. The following steps 
are used to apply Hsiao’s procedure for testing Granger-causality: 
i) Treat Xt as a one-dimensional autoregressive process (9), and compute its FPE with 
the order of lags m varying from 1 to m17. Choose the order which yields the 
smallest FPE, say m, and denote the corresponding FPE as FPEX (m, 0). 
ii) Treat Xt as a controlled variable with m number of lags, and treat Yt as a 
manipulated variable as in (9). Compute again the FPE of (10) by varying the order 
of lags of Yt from 1 to n, and determine the order which gives the smallest FPE, say 
n, and denote the corresponding FPE as FPEX (m,n)18. 
iii) Compare FPEX (m, 0) with FPEX (m,n) [i.e., compare the smallest FPE in step (i) 
with the smallest FPE in step (ii)]. If FPEX (m,0) > FPEX (m,n), then Yt is said to 
cause Xt. If FPEX (m,0) < FPEX (m,n), then Xt is an independent process. 
iv) Repeat steps i) to iii) for the Yt variable, treating Xt as the manipulated variable. 
When Xt and Yt are not stationary variables, but are first-difference stationary [i.e., they are 
I(1) variables] and cointegrated (see Dolado et al., 1990), it is possible to investigate the 
existence of Granger-causal relationships from ∆Xt to ∆Yt and from ∆Yt to ∆Xt, using the 
following error correction models: 
                                                          
17 FPEX(m,0)  is computed using the formula: 1( ,0) · ,
1X
T m SSRFPE m
T m T
   
where T is the total number of observations and SSR is the 
sum of squared residuals of OLS regression (9) 
18 FPEX(m,n)  is computed using the formula: 1( , ) · ,
1X
T m n SSRFPE m n
T m n T
     
where T is the total number of observations and SSR is 
the sum of squared residuals of OLS regression (10) 
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where Zt is the OLS residual of the cointegrating regression ( t tX Y   ), known as the 
error-correction term. Note that, if Xt and Yt are I(1) variables, but they are not 
cointegrated, then β in (12) is assumed to be equal to zero. 
In both cases [i.e., Xt  and Yt  are I(1) variables, and they are or are not cointegrated], we can 
use Hsiao’s sequential procedure substituting Xt with ∆Xt and Yt with ∆Yt in steps i) to iv), 
as well as substituting expressions (9) and (10) with equations (11) and (12). Proceeding in 
this way, we ensure efficiency since the system is congruent and encompassing (Hendry 
and Mizon, 1999). 
As explained above, since the presence and intensity of Granger-causality may vary over 
time, we adopt a dynamic analysis to detect episodes of contagion associated with a 
significant, short-run abrupt increase in the causal linkages. To assess the dynamic 
Granger-causality between sovereign and banking risk, we carry out rolling regressions 
using a window of four quarterly observations.19 In each estimation, we apply the Hsiao 
(1981)’s sequential procedure outlined above to determine the optimum FPE (m, 0) and 
FPE (m, n) statistics in each case.  
5.2. Data 
As indicated above, both aDtDs and wDtDs can be used as aggregate indicators of the 
banking risk in each country. Nevertheless, in this paper, we will focus our analysis on the 
aDtD indicators. As shown in Singh et al. (2014), the evolution of the two indicators is quite 
                                                          
19 We also used values of six and eight observations. The results are broadly in line with those obtained for the 4-quarterly windows and 
are therefore not presented in the interests of space; they are available from the authors upon request. 
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similar but, given the structure of the banking sector in individual EMU countries, the 
aDtD seems to capture the general trend and fluctuation better and avoids sudden jumps 
due to the bankruptcy (or nationalization) of a particular firm with excessive weight. 
Calculations of distance to default are made on a quarterly basis. However, while most of 
the institutions report their numbers each quarter, many others only report them on a half-
yearly basis. So, to ensure data consistency, balance sheet variables are interpolated for 
intermediate dates using cubic splines.  
The sample used to compute the DtD and aggregate DtD series is based on all monetary 
institutions publicly listed and traded in EMU countries between 2004-Q4 to 2013-Q4. 
First, an exhaustive list of all listed/delisted financial institutions is selected from 
Bankscope. Pure-play insurance, pension and mortgage banks are then dropped out using 
Datastream as additional information source. All listed, delisted, restructured or 
nationalised firms are considered in the dataset as long as they were traded on a public 
exchange. The list of variables used in the analysis is summarized in Table 2.  
[Insert Table 2 here] 
While Table 3 summarizes the list of banks by countries and Figure 3 displays the number 
of banks by countries analysed during each period.      
[Insert Table and Figure 3 here] 
Ten-year bond yield spreads with respect to the German bund, which have been calculated 
from data drawn from Datastream, will be the proxy used in this paper to measure 
sovereign risk in nine EMU-founding countries plus Greece. Therefore, our sample 
contains 10 EMU countries, five central (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France and the 
Netherlands) and five peripheral (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain) and we use 
quarterly data from 2004-Q4 to 2013-Q3 (i. e., T=34 observations), since this is the period 
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for which data were available for the construction of the aDtD indicator (see Singh et al. 
2014). 
Graphs in Figure 4 display the evolution of both sovereign and banking risk in the 10 
countries in our sample during the crisis period: from 2007-Q1 to 2012-12.20 The left axis 
corresponds to the banking risk indicator (aDtD) and the right axis to the sovereign risk 
indicator (the 10-year yield spread over Germany). 
[Insert Figure 4 here] 
These graphs show that the sovereign risk indicator registered major increases in all 
countries (even though the levels reached in peripheral economies were much higher than 
those observed in central economies) after the announcement of Greece’s distressed debt 
position in late 2009. However, banking risk fell below 2 (the threshold below which it is 
considered that the banking sector in a country is in distress) coinciding with the collapse 
of Lehman Brothers (October 2008) in Greece, Ireland, Belgium and Finland. From then 
until the end of the period, it continued to display a downward trend in Greece and 
Ireland, but then recovered and achieved levels above 2 one year later in Finland and 
during 2010-2011 in Belgium, coinciding with the brief economic recovery registered in the 
euro area. In the rest of the countries the banking risk indicator presented a value above 2 
throughout the period. Only in Spain and Italy did it approach the threshold value at the 
end of 2008 and 2011 in both cases, and also at the end of 2012 in Spain (just after this 
country requested financial assistance to recapitalize its banking sector).  
It is also worth noting that, with the sole exception of Austria, from the beginning of the 
EMU sovereign crisis both indicators (recall that the lower the value of the banking risk 
                                                          
20 Sovereign risk (measured as 10-year bond spreads over Germany) presented values close to zero during 2005-2007. Actually, after the 
launch of the euro, sovereign bond spreads were more or less stable in most cases until early 2001, followed by a period of compression 
of the spreads which lasted until 2007 (see European Central Bank, 2014). 
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indicator, the higher the risk) present similar evolution since one seems to be the mirror 
image of the other. This result highlights the important interconnection and bidirectional 
linkages between banking and sovereign risk in euro area countries, which was stressed in 
Section 2. 
In order to examine the time-varying behaviour of contagion between the two risks, we 
follow the Bank for International Settlements (2009) and divide the entire time span 
(2005:Q2 to 2013:Q321) into eight stages (stages 2 to 7 correspond to BIS stages 1 to 6).  
The first stage, which ran from 2005:Q2 to 2007:Q2, is a period of stability just before the 
beginning of the economic and financial crisis (starting in June 2007, when losses from 
subprime mortgages began to expose large-scale vulnerabilities). The second stage began in 
2007:Q3 and ends in 2008:Q1. This was the first period of the crisis, characterized by 
concerns over losses on US subprime mortgage loans which escalated into widespread 
financial stress (on 9 August 2007, the turmoil spread to the interbank markets). In brief, 
what initially appeared to be a problem affecting only a small part of the US financial 
system quickly spread more widely, including European Banks. The third stage ran from 
2008:Q2 to 2008:Q3. During this period, after a short respite following the takeover of 
Bear Stearns on 16 March 2008, financial asset prices came under renewed pressure. A 
distinctive feature of the period up to mid-September was an increased investor focus on 
signs that the US recession had spilled over to other major economies, triggering a 
synchronized economic downturn (indeed, the euro area officially entered recession in the 
last quarter of 2008 when its GDP fell -2.1%). The collapse of Lehman Brothers in mid-
September 2008 defined the beginning of the fourth stage, which ended in 2009:Q1. This 
stage of the crisis was marked by concerns about a deepening of the global recession and 
the repercussions of the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy, since the balance sheets of banks all 
                                                          
21 Note that our most parsimonious model is specified as an autoregressive model of order one [AR(1)] in differences and therefore we 
lose two observations at the beginning of the sample. 
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around the globe indicated exposure to their assets. Therefore, policy action was 
implemented on an international scale as governments sought to support market 
functioning and to cushion the blow of rapid economic contraction. In the European 
context, the ECB announced liquidity to support European Banks (in September 2008 the 
Irish government already guaranteed all the deposits/debts of the country’s banks), while 
the European Commission adopted the European Recovery Plan and allowed governments 
to implement measures to bailout banks. Stage 5 started in 2009:Q2, when the first signs of 
recovery appeared and global uncertainty receded (announcements by central banks 
concerning balance sheet expansions, and the range and the amount of assets to be 
purchased, led to significant relief in the financial markets) and ends in 2009:Q3 just before 
the newly elected Greek government announced that the country’s budget deficit was 
much larger than previously reported, marking the beginning of the sovereign debt crisis in 
Europe. The sixth stage began in 2009:Q4 and ended in 2011:Q3. This period was marked 
by concerns about European sovereign debt due to fears that Greece’s debt crisis would 
spread to EMU peripheral countries. Indeed, during this period rescue packages were put 
in place in Greece (May 2010), Ireland (November 2010) and Portugal (April 2011). At the 
end of the period the ECB announced its second covered bond purchase programme. The 
seventh stage of the crisis, which began in 2011:Q4 when Mario Dragi replaced Jean-
Claude Trichet as President of the European Central Bank and ended in 2012:Q2, was still 
a period of high turmoil in European markets. Italy was in the middle of a political crisis 
and the main rating agencies lowered the ratings not only of peripheral countries, but also 
of Austria and France. In this context of financial distress and huge liquidity problems, the 
European Central Bank responded forcefully by implementing (along with other central 
banks) nonstandard monetary policies, i.e., policies beyond setting the refinancing rate. In 
particular, the ECB’s principal means of intervention were the so-called long term 
refinancing operations (LTRO). In November 2011 and March 2012, the ECB allotted to 
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banks an amount close to 500 billion Euros for a three-year period. However, in March 
2012 the second rescue package to Greece was approved and in June 2012 Spain requested 
financial assistance to recapitalize its banking sector. Finally, the last stage of the crisis 
began in 2012:Q3 after Mario Draghi’s statement that he would do “whatever it takes to 
preserve the euro”, which had a healing effect on markets and finished at the end of the 
sample period in 2013:Q3. 
 
6. Results 
As a first step, we tested the order of integration of the aDtDs, and the 10-year bond yield 
spreads by means of Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests. Then, following Cheung and 
Chinn (1997)’s suggestion, we confirmed the results using the Kwiatkowski et al. (1992) 
(KPSS) tests, where the null is a stationary process against the alternative of a unit root. 
The results, not shown here to save space but available from the authors upon request, 
decisively reject the null hypothesis of non-stationarity in the first regressions. They do not 
reject the null hypothesis of stationarity in the first differences, but strongly reject it in 
levels, in the second differences. So, they suggest that both variables can be treated as first-
difference stationary. 
As a second step, we tested for cointegration between each of the 20 pair relationships 
using Johansen (1991, 1995)’s approach. The results suggest22 the absence of long-run 
cointegration between the aDtD and the 10-year yield spread. Therefore, we tested for 
Granger-causality in first differences of the variables, with no error-correction term added 
[i. e., equations (11) and (12) with β=0]. 
 
 
                                                          
22 Again, the results are not presented for reasons of space, but are available from the authors upon request. 
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6.1. Empirical results 
To summarize the results, in Figures 5 we plot the evolution over time of the difference 
between FPE (m, 0) and FPE (m, n) statistics in each case. Therefore, these graphs provide 
us with a view of the dynamic bidirectional influence that exists between sovereign and 
banking risks for each EMU country and constitute our indicator of contagion based on 
time-varying Granger-causality analysis.  
[Insert Figures 5 here] 
In Figure 5a we present the graphs corresponding to the five peripheral EMU countries 
included in the sample (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain), whilst Figure 5b 
displays the graphs corresponding to the five central EMU countries in our sample 
(Austria, Belgium, Finland, France and the Netherlands).  
Note that if the difference is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level in the case 
of, say, the banking to sovereign risk relationship, this indicates the existence of a 
significant, transitory increase in the Granger-causality relationship running from country 
banking risk towards sovereign risk, which we identify with a contagion episode. Therefore, 
the contagion episodes that are significant at the 1% confidence level during each of the 
above mentioned stages, as well as the direction of the contagion and the countries 
involved, 23 are shown in Table 4. 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
Some important observations can be drawn from Figures 5 and Table 4. During the first 
stage, before the financial crisis, contagion mainly took place from sovereigns to banks. We 
find evidence of at least one contagion episode in this direction in seven out of the 10 cases 
studied, the exceptions being Greece, Italy and France. It is noticeable that these episodes 
are mainly concentrated in the second semester of 2005 and in the first semester of 2007, 
                                                          
23 Recall that we associate contagion with a significant, abrupt increase in the short-run causal linkages. 
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coinciding with a period of economic stagnation in EMU countries in the first case and 
with the beginning of a downturn in GDP growth from 2007 in the euro area, which after 
peaking in the last quarter of 2006 (3.7%) began to decrease until it reached negative values 
at the end of 2008. Not a single contagion episode is detected in stages 2 and 3. These 
findings may imply that the US subprime crisis had a scarce impact on European financial 
markets. 
However, following the collapse of Lehman Brothers (stage 4), fears of losses in the 
European banks which were more exposed to US assets triggered contagion episodes from 
banks to sovereigns, mostly in central EMU countries. Indeed, we detect episodes of 
contagion in this direction in Austria, Finland and the Netherlands. These results might 
indicate that central EMU markets were hit more by the international financial crisis than 
peripheral markets. This finding is in accordance with the results presented in Table 1 
indicating governments’ commitments to supporting the banking system during the period 
October 2008-May 2010 and showing that in mid-2010 they were clearly higher in central 
than in peripheral countries (with the exception of Ireland). In particular, the government 
commitment to bail out banks in the three countries above mentioned was between 20% 
and 75% of their GDP.  
During stage 5, some slight signs of recovery were noted as well as an atmosphere of some 
relief in the financial markets; however, in Spain there were also episodes of contagion 
from sovereigns to banks. In the middle of a serious economic crisis (Spanish GDP fell 
4.0% and 2.6%, in 2009:Q3 and 2009:Q4 respectively), as some authors point out, there 
may have been some pressure from governments on banks within their jurisdiction to buy 
their debt. Indeed, at the end of 2011 (see Figure 1a and 1b), the home share of all Spanish 
banks’ sovereign exposure was 81% (the highest in the euro area) and they held the 
equivalent of 44% of Spanish GDP in the form of domestic bonds. This may have 
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broadened concerns about their exposure to bad assets and may have fed speculation about 
their solvency. Besides, episodes of contagion from banks to sovereigns in this stage were 
detected in only two central countries (France and the Netherlands).  
It is noticeable that during stage 6, a period in which concerns about European sovereign 
debt crisis contagion were at their peak and rescue packages to Greece, Ireland and 
Portugal were put in place, episodes of contagion from sovereigns to banks were detected 
in two peripheral countries (Italy and Portugal) and in four central countries (Austria, 
Belgium, Finland and the Netherlands). During this stage, contagion episodes from banks 
to sovereigns were identified in all the peripheral countries. These findings suggest the 
following ideas: (1) In Portugal and Italy, contagion from the sovereign to the banking 
sector can be easily understood, since the main source of vulnerability in those countries 
was concentrated in the public sector itself (see Figure 2). Moreover, Portuguese and Italian 
banks held the equivalent of 23% and 21% of their countries’ GDP in the form of 
domestic bonds (see Figure 1b) which, as we stated above, might have fed speculation 
regarding their solvency; (2) The sudden drop in investor confidence induced fears of 
contagion in all euro area countries and led to “flight-to-safety” investments, which 
increased the demand for the German Bund and also caused a sharp rise in yield spreads of 
EMU central countries. This increase in risk in the sovereign sector may have been 
transmitted to their banking sectors24; (3) Not only in Ireland (where banks’ debt-to-GDP 
was close to 450% at the end of 2012), but also in Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece (see 
Figure 2) the high leverage registered in the banking sector (194%, 150%, 110% and 100% 
                                                          
24 The role of investors’ risk aversion is revealed by the reaction of yields on highly rated sovereign securities. In fact, yields of bonds 
issued by countries with solid fiscal fundamentals, such as Austria, Finland and the Netherlands, also rose vis-à-vis the German Bund. 
These countries maintained their triple-A ratings and therefore the surge in their yields cannot be explained by increased credit risk. Since 
the intensification of the financial crisis in September 2008, flight-to-safety tendencies have increased demand for the Bund, affecting all 
euro area countries’ sovereign spreads, including those for Austria, Finland and the Netherlands (see European Central Bank, 2014). 
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of their GDP respectively, at the end of 2012) may have increased tensions in their already 
vulnerable and distressed public sector. 
Besides, during the seventh stage, coinciding with the nonstandard monetary policies 
implemented by the ECB (two LTRO) to support the banking system, episodes of 
contagion from banks to sovereigns were found mainly in peripheral countries (Greece, 
Ireland, Italy and Portugal). Recall that in spring 2011, the three programme countries 
(Greece, Ireland and Portugal) made up more than 50% of total liquidity provided through 
both the main refinancing operations (MRO) and the LTRO windows – although some 
episodes were also detected in this direction in Austria, France and the Netherlands. It is 
also noticeable that in Spain, a country that requested financial assistance to recapitalize its 
banking sector in June 2012, one episode of contagion from the sovereign to the banking 
sector was identified just after the rescue (2012:Q3). This result suggests that in the Spanish 
case, even though the country only requested assistance for its financial sector, the banking 
sector risk was clearly transferred to the sovereign risk.   
The last stage ran from July 2012 till the end of the sample period. Despite the healing 
effects of Mario Draghi’s words on financial markets, some episodes of contagion were still 
found from sovereigns to banks in Italy and Finland and from banks to sovereigns 
(Portugal, Spain, France and the Netherlands). We should keep in mind that, although 
turbulence in financial markets fell sharply, the economic recession entered its second dip 
during this eriod (see Figure 2c). Thus, as Shambaugh (2012) pointed out, not only did the 
problems of weak banks and high sovereign debt reinforce each other, but were both 
exacerbated by weak economic growth. 
Finally, it is worth noting that from early 2005 till the collapse of Lehman Brothers, more 
than 90% of the total contagion episodes detected were from sovereigns to banks, whereas 
after the last quarter of 2008, coinciding with the beginning of the financial crisis and the 
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implementation of government measures to support financial institutions, the direction of 
contagion underwent a change. In this second sub-period the majority of the contagion 
episodes (around 63% of the total) ran from banks to sovereigns: specifically, in the cases 
of France, Greece, and Ireland (where contagion episodes were detected only in this 
direction), and Portugal and the Netherlands (where they accounted for more than 70% of 
the total episodes). Conversely, in Belgium and Finland contagion was mainly identified 
from sovereigns to banks, whilst in Spain, Italy and Austria there were similar numbers of 
contagion episodes in both directions.   
 
7. Concluding remarks. 
In recent years the euro area has faced three interlocking crises (banking, sovereign debt, 
and economic growth) which together have challenged the viability of the currency union 
(see Shambaugh, 2012). The interrelationship between debt and growth is a matter of great 
importance; however, its analysis is beyond the scope of this paper, which focuses on the 
interconnection between banking and sovereign debt crises in EMU countries. Whereas 
there is a substantial amount of literature exploring the determinants of either bank risk or 
sovereign risk in isolation in the euro area context, few papers to date have looked at the 
interdependence or contagion between the sovereign and the banking sectors.  
Based on indicators of bank and sovereign risk which have not been used previously in the 
literature, and applying a dynamic approach to testing for Granger-causality, we investigate 
the possible existence of contagion between the two measures of risk in ten of the 
countries that have belonged to the EMU since its inception (only Luxembourg and 
Germany are excluded from the analysis). Our direct analysis of the data allows us to detect 
episodes of sudden and temporary increases in pairwise Granger-causal relationships which 
we identify with contagion. To contextualize the empirical results, we follow the Bank for 
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International Settlements (2009) and divide the entire time span (2005:Q2 to 2013:Q3) into 
eight stages. 
The main conclusions that can be drawn from our analysis are the following. First, from 
early 2005 till the collapse of Lehman Brothers (stages 1 to 3), more than 90% of the total 
contagion episodes detected were from sovereigns to banks and coincided with a period of 
economic stagnation in EMU countries or with the beginning of a downturn in GDP 
growth in the euro area. Second, after the last quarter of 2008, coinciding with the 
beginning of the financial crisis and the implementation of government measures to 
support financial institutions, the direction of the contagion underwent a change. In this 
second sub-period (stages 4 to 8) the majority of the episodes (around 63% of the total) ran 
from banks to sovereigns. Specifically, in the cases of France, Greece, Ireland (only 
contagion episodes in this direction were detected), Portugal and the Netherlands (where 
they account for more than 70% of the episodes). Conversely, in Belgium and Finland 
contagion was mainly from sovereigns to banks, while in Spain, Italy and Austria there 
were similar numbers of episodes of contagion in both directions.   
It is also noticeable that during stage 6, when concerns about European sovereign debt 
crisis contagion were at their peak and rescue packages were provided for Greece, Ireland 
and Portugal, episodes of contagion from sovereigns to banks were detected in two 
peripheral countries (Italy and Portugal) and in four central countries (Austria, Belgium, 
Finland and the Netherlands), whereas contagion episodes from banks to sovereigns were 
identified in all peripheral countries. These findings may suggest that the sudden drop in 
investor confidence induced fears of contagion in all euro area countries and led to “flight-
to-safety” investments, which in turn increased the demand for the German Bund and also 
caused a sharp rise in yield spreads in central EMU countries. This increase in risk in the 
sovereign sector might have been transmitted to the banking sectors which held significant 
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amounts of sovereign debt. Besides, not just in Ireland, but in the other peripheral EMU 
countries as well, the high leverage registered in the banking sector may have increased 
tensions in their already vulnerable and distressed public sectors. 
Moreover, during the seventh stage, coinciding with the nonstandard monetary policies 
implemented by the ECB (two LTRO) to support the banking system, episodes of 
contagion from banks to sovereigns were found mainly in peripheral countries (Greece, 
Ireland, Italy and Portugal). This is consistent with the fact that in spring 2011, the three 
programme countries (Greece, Ireland and Portugal) made up more than 50% of total 
liquidity provided through both the main refinancing operations (MRO) and the LTRO 
windows. Finally, in the last stage, from July 2012 till the end of the sample period, despite 
the healing effects of Mario Draghi’s words on financial markets, we still detect some 
episodes of contagion in both directions. We should keep in mind that, although the 
turbulence in the financial markets dropped sharply, the economic recession entered its 
second dip in stage 8 of our sample period. This supports the idea that the problems of 
weak banks and high sovereign debt not only reinforced each other, but they were both 
exacerbated by weak economic growth. 
All in all, our findings present empirical evidence about the existence of bidirectional 
linkages between bank and sovereign risk (i.e., a “diabolic loop” as suggested by 
Brunnemeier et al., 2011, or a ‘‘two-way feedback’’ transmission channel as advocated by 
Acharya et al., 2014, which have been broadly explained in Section 2 and represented a key 
element in the European sovereign crisis). Therefore, in order to avoid further market 
distorsions in the future, both national and supra-national efforts should be made. Indeed, 
since our results suggests that markets become increasingly integrated during episodes 
marked by a global financial crisis, they should be beneficial for regulators and 
policymakers who are interested in analysing interactions between sectoral crises and in 
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understanding the behaviour and reaction of euro area markets especially during episodes 
marked by a major financial recession. The debate around the creation of a European 
Banking Union stimulates more interest in studying the distortions characterizing 
European banking systems. Moreover, our findings may also be useful to to investors, 
portfolio managers, pension fund managers and other institutional investors who are 
contemplating investing in international European banks, in order to make more informed 
portfolio allocation decisions.  
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Figure 1 
Figure 1.a. Home share of total banks’ sovereign exposure (gross direct long exposure)-December 31, 2011
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                                  Source: European Bank Authority: http://www.eba.europa.eu/risk-analysis-and-data/eu-wide-stress-testing/2011/results 
Figure 1.b. Banks’ sovereign exposure to their own country bonds-to-GDP, December 2011                   
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Figure 1.c. ECB long-term refinancing operations (LTRO) and GDP growth: 1999-2013
                                                                        
                                                                 Source: European Central Bank: http://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/implement/omo/html/top_history.en.html and Eurostat
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Figure 2. Banks and Sovereign debt-to-GDP: 2002-2012 
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Figure 3. Number of banks used in each period by each country 
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Figure 4. Banking and Sovereign risk in EMU countries: 2007-2012 
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Source: Datastream and authors’ calculations. 
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Figure 5. Time-varying causality between sovereign and banking risk, 2005:Q2-2013Q3 
Figure 5a. EMU peripheral countries.  
 
 
                                                    
Note: GR, IE, IT, PT and SP stand for Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain respectively. We plot the differences between the FPE 
obtained when estimating sovereign spread series using only the information contained in past sovereign spread series and the FPE 
obtained also using the information contained in past aDtD series (aDtD→Spreads) and the differences between FPE obtained when 
estimating the aDtD series using only the information contain in past aDtD series and the FPE obtained using also the information 
contained in past sovereign spread series (Spreads→aDtD). We associate contagion from country banking risk towards sovereign risk 
with those episodes where the difference aDtD→Spreads (left axis) is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level, and contagion 
from sovereign risk towards country banking risk with those episodes where the difference Spreads→aDtD  (right axis) is positive and 
statistically significant at the 1% level. 
 
 
 
 46
Figure 5. Time-varying causality between sovereign and banking risk, 2005:Q2-2013Q3 
Figure 5b. EMU central countries.  
 
 
                                                       
Note: AT, BE, FI, FR and NL stand for Austria, Belgium, Finland, France and the Netherlands respectively. We plot the differences 
between the FPE obtained when estimating sovereign spread series using only the information contained in past sovereign spread series 
and the FPE obtained also using the information contained in past aDtD series (aDtD→Spreads) and the differences between FPE 
obtained when estimating the aDtD series using only the information contain in past aDtD series and the FPE obtained using also the 
information contained in past sovereign spread series (Spreads→aDtD). We associate contagion from country banking risk towards 
sovereign risk with those episodes where the difference aDtD→Spreads (left axis) is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level, 
and contagion from sovereign risk towards country banking risk with those episodes where the difference Spreads→aDtD  (right axis) is 
positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. 
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Table 1. Government support measures for financial institutions (October 2008-May 2010) 
Country Capital injection Liability guarantees Asset support Total 
commitment 
as % of 2008 
GDP 
Deposit 
insurance 
in Euros 
Within 
schemes 
Outside 
schemes 
Guaranteed 
issuance of 
bonds 
Other 
guarantees, 
loans 
Within 
schemes 
Outside 
schemes 
Austria 5.8 (15) 0.6 21.8 (75) 0 - (-) - 32 Unlimited 
Belgium - (-) 19.9 34 (-) 90.8 -(-) 16.9 47 100,000 
Finland -(4) - -(50) 0 -(-) - 29 50,000 
France 8.3 (21) 3 134.2(320) 0 -(-) - 18 70,000 
Greece 3.2 (5) - 14.4 (30) 0 4.4 (8) - 18 100,000 
Ireland 12.3 (10) 7 72.5 (485) 0 8(90) - 319 Unlimited 
Italy 41.1 (12) - -(-) 0 -(50) - 4 103,291 
Netherlands 10.2 (20) 16.8 54.2(200) 50 -(-) 21.4 52 100,000 
Portugal -(4) - 5.4 (16) 0 -(-) - 12 100,000 
Spain 11 (99) 1.3 56.4 (100) 9 19.3 (50) 2.5 24 Unlimited 
Notes: All amounts are in billions of EUR, except for the last two columns. Figures in brackets denote total committed funds and figures 
outside brackets are the amounts utilized up to May 2010. ‘‘Within schemes’’ refers to a collective bailout programme that can be 
accessed by any bank that fulfils the requirements for that particular aid scheme. ‘‘Outside schemes’’ are individually tailored aid 
measures (ad hoc schemes). Source: Stolz and Wedow (2010). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Variables used in the “Distance-to-Default” indicator 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Balance sheet variables 
Variables Definiton Source 
Total assets As reported in annual/interim reports Bankscope (Code 2025) 
Short-term liabilities Deposits and short-term funding Bankscope (Code 2030) 
Total equity As reported in annual/interim reports Bankscope (Code 2055) 
Daily market based variables 
Risk-free interest rate Benchmark 10Y bond yield of country where the bank 
headquarter is based 
Thomson Datastream 
Market capitalization Daily closing share price multiplied by total outstanding 
share in public 
Thomson Datastream 
 48
Table 3. List of banks by countries used in the “Distance-to-Default” indicator 
Name Status Country ISIN 
Austria 
UniCredit Bank Austria AG Delisted AT AT0000995006 
Erste Group Bank AG Listed AT AT0000652011 
Raiffeisen Bank International AG Listed AT AT0000606306 
Belgium 
Dexia Listed BE BE0003796134 
KBC Groep NV Listed BE BE0003565737 
Spain 
Banco Santander SA Listed SP ES0113900J37 
Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria SA Listed SP ES0113211835 
Caixabank, S.A. Listed SP ES0140609019 
Bankia, SA Listed SP ES0113307021 
Banco de Sabadell SA Listed SP ES0113860A34 
Banco Popular Espanol SA Listed SP ES0113790226 
Caja de Ahorros del Mediterraneo CAM Listed SP ES0114400007 
Bankinter SA Listed SP ES0113679I37 
Renta 4 Banco, S.A. Listed SP ES0173358039 
Finland 
Pohjola Bank Plc Listed FI FI0009003222 
Aktia Bank Plc Listed FI FI4000058870 
Alandsbanken Abp-Bank of Aland Plc Listed FI FI0009001127 
France 
Credit Agricole Sud Rhône Alpes Listed FR FR0000045346 
Paris Orléans SA Listed FR FR0000031684 
Credit Agricole de la Touraine et du Poitou Listed FR FR0000045304 
Credit Agricole Alpes Provence Listed FR FR0000044323 
Crédit Agricole Nord de France Listed FR FR0000185514 
Crédit Agricole d'Ile-de-France Listed FR FR0000045528 
Crédit Agricole Loire Haute-Loire Listed FR FR0000045239 
Crédit Industriel et Commercial Listed FR FR0005025004 
Banque Tarneaud Delisted FR FR0000065526 
Caisse régionale de crédit agricole mutuel de Normandie-Seine Listed FR FR0000044364 
Caisse Régionale de Crédit Agricole Mutuel du Languedoc Listed FR FR0010461053 
Natixis Listed FR FR0000120685 
Crédit Agricole de l'Ille-et-Vilaine Listed FR FR0000045213 
Crédit Agricole d'Aquitaine Delisted FR FR0000044547 
Société Générale Listed FR FR0000130809 
Crédit Agricole S.A. Listed FR FR0000045072 
BNP Paribas Listed FR FR0000131104 
Boursorama Listed FR FR0000075228 
Crédit Agricole du Morbihan Listed FR FR0000045551 
Crédit Agricole Brie Picardie Listed FR FR0010483768 
Société Alsacienne de Développement et d'Expansion Delisted FR FR0000124315 
Greece 
National Bank of Greece SA Listed GR GRS003003019 
Piraeus Bank SA Listed GR GRS014003008 
Eurobank Ergasias SA Listed GR GRS323003004 
Alpha Bank AE Listed GR GRS015013006 
Marfin Investment Group Listed GR GRS314003005 
Attica Bank SA-Bank of Attica SA Listed GR GRS001003003 
General Bank of Greece SA Listed GR GRS002003010 
Ireland 
Depfa Bank Plc Delisted IE IE0072559994 
Irish Bank Resolution Corporation Limited-IBRC Delisted IE IE00B06H8J93 
Permanent TSB Plc Delisted IE IE0004678656 
Bank of Ireland Listed IE IE0030606259 
Allied Irish Banks plc Listed IE IE0000197834 
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Italy
UniCredit SpA Listed IT IT0004781412 
Intesa Sanpaolo Listed IT IT0000072618 
Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena SpA Listed IT IT0001334587 
Unione di Banche Italiane Scpa Listed IT IT0003487029 
Banco Popolare – Società Cooperativa Listed IT IT0004231566 
Mediobanca SpA Listed IT IT0000062957 
Banca popolare dell'Emilia Romagna Listed IT IT0000066123 
Banca Popolare di Milano ScaRL Listed IT IT0000064482 
Banca Carige SpA Listed IT IT0003211601 
Banca Popolare di Sondrio Societa Cooperativa per Azioni Listed IT IT0000784196 
Credito Emiliano SpA-CREDEM Listed IT IT0003121677 
Credito Valtellinese Soc Coop Listed IT IT0000064516 
Banca popolare dell'Etruria e del Lazio Soc. coop. Listed IT IT0004919327 
Credito Bergamasco Listed IT IT0000064359 
Banco di Sardegna SpA Listed IT IT0001005070 
Banco Desio - Banco di Desio e della Brianza SpA Listed IT IT0001041000 
Banca Ifis SpA Listed IT IT0003188064 
Banca Generali SpA Listed IT IT0001031084 
Banca Intermobiliare di Investimenti e Gestioni Listed IT IT0000074077 
Banca Popolare di Spoleto SpA Listed IT IT0001007209 
Banca Profilo SpA Listed IT IT0001073045 
Banca Finnat Euramerica SpA Listed IT IT0000088853 
Netherlands  
SNS Reaal NV Delisted NL NL0000390706 
RBS Holdings NV Delisted NL NL0000301109 
ING Groep NV Listed NL NL0000303600 
Delta Lloyd NV-Delta Lloyd Group Listed NL NL0009294552 
Van Lanschot NV Listed NL NL0000302636 
BinckBank NV Listed NL NL0000335578 
Portugal 
Montepio Holding SGPS SA Delisted PT PTFNB0AM0005 
Banco Comercial Português, SA Listed PT PTBCP0AM0007 
Banco Espirito Santo SA Listed PT PTBES0AM0007 
Banco BPI SA Listed PT PTBPI0AM0004 
BANIF - Banco Internacional do Funchal, SA Listed PT PTBAF0AM0002 
Source: Bankscope 
AT, BE, FI, FR, GR, IE, IT, NT, PT and SP stand for Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Portugal and Spain respectively.  
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Table 4. Evolution of contagion episodes 
 
 Stage Contagion Direction of 
contagion 
Peripheral 
countries 
Central 
Countries 
 
 
 
Before 
Lehman 
Brothers 
Collapse 
 
First stage:  
(2005:Q2 to 2007:Q2)  
Yes Sovereign to banks Ireland (2007:Q2)
Portugal (2005:Q3) 
Spain (2005:Q4) 
Spain( 2006:Q3) 
 
Austria (2005:Q4) 
Austria( 2007:Q2) 
Belgium (2005:Q3) 
Finland (2005:Q2) 
Finland ( 2005:Q3) 
Netherlands (2007:Q1) 
No Banks to sovereigns - - 
Second stage:  
(2007:Q3 to 2008:Q1) 
No Sovereign to banks - - 
No Banks to sovereigns - - 
Third stage: 
(2008:Q2 to 2008:Q3) 
No Sovereign to banks - - 
No Banks to sovereigns - - 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
After 
Lehman 
Brothers 
Collapse 
 
Fourth stage: 
(2008:Q4 to 2009:Q1) 
No Sovereign to banks - - 
Yes Banks to sovereigns - Austria (2009:Q1)
Finland (2008:Q4) 
Finland (2009:Q1) 
Netherlands (2009:Q1) 
 
Fifth stage: 
(2009:Q2 to 2009:Q3) 
Yes Sovereign to banks Spain (2009:Q3)
Spain (2009:Q4) 
 
- 
Yes Banks to sovereigns - France (2009:Q2)
France (2009:Q3) 
Netherlands (2009:Q3) 
 
Sixth stage: 
(2009:Q4 to 2011:Q3) 
Yes Sovereign to banks Italy (2009: Q4)
Italy (2010:Q4) 
Portugal (2009:Q4) 
 
 
Austria (2010: Q3)
Austria (2011:Q1) 
Austria (2011:Q2) 
Belgium (2011:Q1) 
Finland (2010:Q3) 
Netherlands (2011:Q3) 
Yes Banks to sovereigns Greece (2011:Q3)
Ireland (2011:Q3) 
Italy (2011:Q3) 
Portugal (2011:Q3) 
Spain (2011:Q1) 
Austria (2011:Q2)
France (2011:Q3) 
Seventh stage: 
(2011:Q4 to 2012:Q2) 
Yes Sovereign to banks Spain (2012:Q3) Netherlands (2011:Q4)
 
Yes 
Banks to sovereigns Greece (2012:Q1)
Ireland (2011:Q4) 
Italy (2011:Q4) 
Italy (2012:Q1) 
Portugal (2012:Q2) 
 
Austria (2012:Q1)
France (2011:Q4) 
Netherlands (2012:Q2) 
 
Eight stage: 
(2012:Q3 to 2013:Q3) 
Yes Sovereign to banks Italy (2013:Q1) Finland (2012:Q4) 
Finland (2013:Q1) 
 
Yes Banks to sovereigns Portugal (2012:Q3)
Spain (2013:Q1) 
Spain (2013:Q2) 
 
France (2012:Q4)
Netherlands (2012:Q3) 
Netherlands (2013:Q2) 
Notes: Contagion episodes are significant at the 1% level. 
